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1 Introduction
Lack of savings and capital make it difficult for
many poor people to become self-employed and to
undertake productive employment-generating
activities. Providing credit seems to be a way to
generate self-employment opportunities for the
poor. But because the poor lack physical collateral,
they have almost no access to institutional credit.
Informal lenders can be a source of credit, but poor
households do not gain from investing in produc-
tive income-increasing activities because of high
interest rates. Moreover, although informal groups
such as the rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCA) or chit funds can meet the occasional
financial needs of the poor, they are not reliable
sources of finance for income-generating activities.
In addition, the poor can rarely save enough to
form and participate in such informal groups. Also
village-based informal groups, as they are formed
with people living in the same agroclimatic area,
are risky sources of finance for business/enterpris-
ing activities because of covariate risk that affects
equally every member of the group. A micro-credit
programme which is able to pool risk across agro-
climatic areas can provide credit to the poor at
affordable cost and can help them become produc-
tively self-employed.
Micro-credit programmes have thus emerged as an
antipoverty instrument in many low-income coun-
tries. They target the poor, especially women, with
financial services to help them become self-
employed in rural non-farm activities of their
choice. In contrast, micro-credit programmes of
the village banks supported by Accion
International or Women's World Banking provide
financial services in response to market failures in
which formal financial institutions failed to cater
financial services to small- and medium-scale
enterprïses. No matter whether they are instru-
ments for poverty reduction or market failure,
micro-credit programmes practice financial inter-
mediation for their targeted clienteles.
The article reviews the methodologies practiced to
evaluate micro-credit programmes and provides a
unified framework, and discusses future research
The views expressed in the article are those of the
author exclusively and do not in any way reflect the
World Bank's official views.
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directions. It is organised as follows: section 2 dis-
cusses the economic rationale for micro-credit pro-
grammes targeted to the poor which motivates that
impact assessments are an integral part of micro-
credit programme evaluation; section 3 reviews the
current literature on micro-finance; section 4 dis-
cusses estimation issues concerning programme
benefit assessments; the concluding section dis-
cusses policy implications and further avenues for
research on micro-finance.
2 Why Micro-Credit Matters for
Poor Households
Households may derive benefits such as income,
employment, and consumption from access to
micro-credit programmes. However, the benefits
from programme participation must be at least as
great as the costs for households to participate in a
micro-credit programme. Possible benefits of par-
ticipation include induced changes in income,
employment and other welfare indicators. Explicit
interest costs of borrowing and implicit costs asso-
ciated with programme participation, such as
attending group meetings and monitoring fellow
members' activities, constitute the possible costs of
programme participation.
Both benefits and costs are likely to vary depending
on the gender of programme participants. For
socio-cultural reasons, men's time (or that of other
household members) is a poor substitute for
women's time in many societies. Women are largely
involved in the production of important non-mar-
ket activities, such as child-care and food. Thus, for
a woman to work a full day may entail forgoing the
production and consumption of highly valued non-
market household activities. Women's wage
employment outside the home is thus not a viable
option for many rural women, who spend most of
their time producing non-market household goods.
However, rural households can produce home-
based market goods such as handicrafts - goods for
market sale that are not culturally frowned upon.
Not only can these activities be produced using
part-time labour, but they do not require produc-
tion to be done outside the home. Although many
of these activities can be performed at low levels of
capital intensity, other home-based market goods
require a minimum level of capital. This minimum
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is often the result of the indivisibility of capital.
Dairy farming, for example, requires at least one
cow; hand-powered looms have a minimum size.
For other activities, such as paddy husking, for
which the indivisibility of physical capital is not an
issue, transaction costs (or the high costs of infor-
mation) establish a floor on the minimal level of
operations. In many countries, including
Bangladesh, household income and wealth are so
low that the costs of initiating production at mini-
mal economic levels are high.
When households have access to wage employ-
ment, they may choose between working for home-
based non-market production and for wage
employment. There is a trade-off between these two
types of production - wage employment requires
full-time involvement and, hence, there is a cost
that households incur for undertaking wage
employment. For socio-economic reasons, the
transaction cost of wage employment is higher for
women than for men, making the cost of employ-
ment for women higher. For both men and women,
the opportunity cost of non-market production is
equal to the market wage less the transactions cost
of wage employment. That means, even if women
are allowed to work outside the home, women's
participation in the wage labour market depends on
the size of the transaction cost of wage employ-
ment. Women are more likely to allocate more
labour to home production if the transaction cost of
wage employment is positive than they do if it is
zero. In fact, the transaction cost of wage employ-
ment can be high enough to make the opportunity
cost of non-market production zero, or even nega-
tive, and women will work exclusively for non-mar-
ket production.
Even if market wage employment is restricted for
women, they can be self-employed at home because
micro-credit programmes enable poor women to
engage in home-based market production. In this
event, the shadow price of home-based non-market
production is reduced by the value of the marginal
product of time in home-based market production.
However, the net cost to non-market production
will depend on whether market-based production
and non-market production are managed jointly If
home-based market and non-market production
are not jointly managed, then the shadow price of
non-market production is the net wage from wage
employment (i.e., wage less transaction cost of wage
employment). This is similar to the case in which
no market-based production takes place because of
lack of access to credit to finance self-employment
business activity If home-based market and non-
market production are jointly produced, then the
shadow price of non-market production is reduced
by the marginal product of labour of home-based
market production. That means an increase in
home-based market production can be accompa-
nied by increase in home-based non-market pro-
duction without incurring any cost for the former;
the time devoted to non-market production also
provides home-based market production with the
same efficiency, because there is no opportunity
cost in terms of home-based market production
from the reallocation of time. Because non-market
and home-based market production can be carried
out in a flexible way, it is possible that households
would benefit from withdrawing labour from the
wage market if funds are made available to buy the
minimum capital needed to initiate home-based
market production.
For the very poor, especially for women, access to
credit may thus alter the optimal time allocation
from home production of non-market activities,
such as child-care, to home-based market produc-
tion. If household consumption is at or near the
minimal levels necessary for survival, so that saving
is almost infinitely costly even a small quantity of
credit can have a large impact on household welfare
by shifting women's time from the production of
non-market goods. This is clearly a welfare gain for
poor households, as the non-market production
may have a low shadow value compared to home-
based market production, the marginal product of
which is high. In addition, programme participa-
tion may alter the technology parameters by pro-
viding information and training, which may affect
efficiency in both non-market and home-based
market production and, hence, income and con-
sumption.
Non-market production may rise or fall in house-
holds that borrow in order to start home-based
market production. The direction of change in non-
market production depends on the size of the
income effects, the substitutability of market inputs
for time inputs, and the degree to which the same
unit of (women's) time can produce home-based
13
market and non-market goods. Micro-credit pro-
gramme participation may also affect household
allocations by altering womens bargaining power.
Bargaining power may increase with women's par-
ticipation in a micro-credit programme - the result
of controlling additional resources through targeted
credit and consciousness-promoting training.
Because of credit market imperfections, the poor
access to credit may make a large impact on their
welfare. Credit market imperfections may again dif-
fer according to gender - women are more likely to
be credit constrained than men. Micro-credit pro-
grammes often provide non-credit inputs such as
consciousness-raising training and these inputs may
empower the poor, especially women. Moreover,
men and women may have different preferences.
Thus, the impact of the programme may vary
according to the gender of the programme's partici-
pants. This is a possible testable hypothesis for
assessing programme impact which will have a
bearing upon policies providing credit to the poor
and women.
3 Review of Existing Literature
Micro-credit programmes are seen as financial inter-
mediaries. Not surprisingly, a large body of the
micro-finance literature dwells largely on the finan-
cial viability of targeted credit programmes. The
primary concern of this literature is the cost effi-
ciency of micro-finance institutions. That is, it
addresses issues such as the amount it costs to
deliver these services and whether the programmes
providing them are cost-effective (that is, meet the
programme costs with interest income). However,
as many micro-finance institutions use grants or
soft loans to provide services to target clients,
micro-finance involves subsidies. Consequently,
this body of micro-finance literature addresses
questions such as how much subsidy these pro-
grammes enjoy, whether they are able to eliminate
subsidy, and, if so, how (Yaron 1992b).
The literature also raises questions about the distri-
bution of subsidies, namely who benefits from
these programmes. Program evaluation is based not
only on seif-sustainability but also on programme
outreach, measured by the coverage of target house-
holds and the extent of services they receive (Yaron
1992a; Bennett and Cuevas 1995). Outreach
indicators are taken as proxies for development
impacts of micro-credit programmes, assuming that
self-sustainable financial institutions are likely to
contribute to income expansion and poverty reduc-
tion - that is, the output of efficient rural financial
intermediation leads to the desired development
impact (Yaron, McDonald, and Piperk 1997). The
twin criteria of outreach and seif-sustainability
become the yardstick of micro-credit programme
evaluation (Yaron 1992a, 1992b; Christen, Rhyne,
and Vogel 1994; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega 1996;
Mahajan and Ramola 1996).
The assumption that only an efficient financial insti-
tution produces a desirable development impact
may be questioned. Under certain conditions, even
an inefficient financial system which is not self-sus-
tainable may merit the necessary government subsi-
dies. For instance, the Indian formal financial
intermediaries, which are unsustainable without
government subsidies, are nevertheless contribut-
ing to the growth of the rural economy (Binswanger
and Khandker 1995). On the other hand, pro-
grammes such as micro-finance institutions, even if
they are effective in reaching target clients and are
self-sustainable, may generate benefits that are not
sustainable, or benefits that are marginal, so that
they do not have an overall growth impact (Bouman
and Hospes 1994). In other words, simple outreach
of a self-sustainable financial institution does not
guarantee that participants and society do benefit
from such investments.2
A second body of literature, therefore, focuses on
the direct impacts of micro-finance on poverty
reduction and other dimensions of household wel-
fare. Improved access to credit is expected to over-
come credit market imperfections, which can
smooth consumption and ease constraints in pro-
duction, raising the incomes and productivity of the
poor. Many studies have attempted to measure the
impact of micro-credit on income, employment,
and other socio-economic outcomes, including
contraceptive use and fertility (BIDS 1990; Alam
Z Hulme (1997) provides a fascinating story from the
United Kingdom that invalidates the argument of
institutional sustainability and institutional outreach.
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented increase in
outreach and profitability of financial institutions in the
U.K. However, it turned out that it actually created a
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1988; Amin et al. 1994; Amin and Pebley 1990;
Hossain 1988; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Pitt and
Khandker 1996; Schuler and Hashemi 1994). With
the exception of Pitt and Khandker (1996), the
major problem with this large body of literature is
that it has failed to indicate whether the measured
benefits are due to programme participation.
Estimates usually fail to consider the self-selection
process involved in programme participation and
non-randomness of programme placement (Pitt and
Khandker 1996). Another problem of the impact
literature is that it ignores the cost of programme
placement to indicate whether the induced benefits
of programme placement are worth the cost.
Microcredit programmes are often subsidised and,
hence, seen as transfer mechanisms. Even if this is
so, micro-credit programmes must be able to trans-
fer resources in a cost-effective way But targeted
micro-credit to the poor is one of many instruments
for poverty reduction. Broad-based economic
growth policies, Food for Work, and targeted wage
employmenf schemes are some of the non-credit
instruments that also help reduce poverty Micro-
finance institutions must thus be evaluated against
the performance of alternative instruments for
poverty reduction. Often, the poverty impact of
these instruments is assessed in terms of the impact
of programme participation on income, employ-
ment, and consumption. While this is a well-estab-
lished approach, it overlooks the financial
performance of banks or bank-like organisations
delivering financial services to the poor or serving
as a mechanism for social transfer.
Also, even if participants do benefit from micro-
finance institutions, such programmes may hurt
others in society or may achieve benefits less effi-
ciently than alternative programmes. This raises the
issues of externalities, income redistribution and
the cost-effectiveness of alternative programme
intervention. Because of programme externalities, it
is possible that benefits accruing to the poor are
generated at the expense of others in society so that
'bubble' that destroyed many enterprises and
impoverished hundreds of thousands of households.
Hulme (1997) also reported a study that observed that
programmes performing well in terms of outreach and
repayment rates have negative impacts in terms of
womenl empowerment.
the programme intervention is not Pareto efficient.3
Pareto efficiency is more likely to be achieved in a
regime in which economic growth permits the
expansion of existing activities or the development
of new activities that benefit participants without
hurting others (World Bank 1994). On the other
hand, since subsidised funds have alternate uses
through which the poor can also benefit, pro-
gramme evaluation of micro-finance institutions
must be made on the basis of cost-effectiveness of
alternative antipoverty programmes.
An ideal method for programme evaluation is,
therefore, an integrated approach that carries out
cost-benefit analyses of alternative programmes
promoting welfare of both target and non-target
households. Programme evaluation is, of course,
subject to the social welfare function. If the objec-
tive is to promote societyb welfare, then the impact
must be assessed for both target and non-target
households, as well as participants and non-partic-
ipants. If the social objective function is distribu-
tionally neutral, then an evaluation of the target
population is sufficient to justify programme inter-
vention. But, such an evaluation is incomplete,
because it ignores programme externalities. For
example, agricultural development banks, which
are subsidised in many countries, are evaluated on
the basis of what happens to agricultural growth. A
recent evaluation of formal financial institutions in
India finds that, although credit programmes were
targeted to reach farmers, it is the rural non-farm
economy and not agriculture which is the principal
beneficiary because credit is fungible across activi-
ties and households (Binswanger and Khandker
1995). Khandker (1998) provides estimates of the
full costs and benefits of some micro-credit and
alternative programmes to justify whether micro-
credit programmes are worth supporting.
The third body of micro-finance literature addresses
loan recovery rate and delivery mechanism of
micro-credit programmes. Imperfect information
and imperfect enforcement of loan contracts are two
major sources of high loan default costs of formal
Interventions are Pareto efficient when they benefit at
least one person while leaving everyone else at least as
well off as before the interventions.
Group lending can have both positive and negative
effects on loan repayments. It increases loan repayment
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banks in many low income countries (Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981, 1983). Thus, even if financial institu-
tions are allowed to set their own interest rates as
suggested by a number of studies (von Pischke and
others 1983), the imperfect information literature
argues that this would not necessarily improve the
loan recovery rates, and targeted credit programmes
would not reach the target households even if the
price of loan is right (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990).
Varian (1990), Stiglitz (1990), and Besley and Coate
(1995) have identified several credit market failures
that group-based micro-credit programmes have
overcome. In particular, group-based lending and
other social mechanisms help resolve the problems
of imperfect information and imperfect enforce-
ment of lending. By relying on peer pressure to
monitor and enforce contracts, group-based lend-
ing provides an incentive for borrowers to repay
and helps avoid adverse selection of borrowers,
thereby improving loan recovery rates (Rashid and
Townsend 1994 and Wenner 1995). While group-
based lending does not always improve loan recov-
ery (Besley and Coate 1995), it constitutes a
powerful incentive for repayment when it helps cre-
ate social collateral' that works against loan
default.4 Conning considers the implication of
group lending as one of several optimal borrowing
strategies and examines whether joint liability con-
tracts can be designed to create the social capital
required to replace physical collateral. This theoret-
ical literature on group lending provides some
testable implications about the nature of contracts
required to generate social capital, the optimal size
of group, and the sorting of individuals info groups
on the basis of risk preference and other
characteristics.
However, social collateral cannot be the sole reason
for high loan recovery - social collateral can also be
harnessed through involving community or village
leaders in individual lending schemes such as the
Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) in Indonesia and
elsewhere (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega 1996; Patten
and Rosengard 1991; Riedinger 1994; Yaron 1992a,
because successful borrowers may help repay loans of
less successful borrowers unable to repay Group
lending may also reduce the repayment rate if the entire
group defaults (i.e. when some borrowers who would
have paid default because other group members have
done so).
1994; Webster and Fidler 1995). For targeting and
identifying the poor, group lending is better than
individual lending because programme participa-
tion is self-targeting in a group-based lending
(Khandker, Khalily, and Khan 1995), while individ-
ual lending can 'perpetuate and reinforce the exist-
ing socioeconomic inequities and access to scarce
financial resources' (Yaron 1992a; p.12). Thus,
group lending can lead to better targeting and bet-
ter loan repayment through self-selection, peer
monitoring, and creation of social collateral.
However, group-lending is not a panacea for loan
default. Although group lending is found to deliver
financial services to the poor en masse with little
cost, such a loan delivery mechanism appears too
simplistic to cope with difficult issues such as the
low loan absorptive capacity of individual borrow-
ers. In fact, when loan recovery rate is the basis for
repeated loans in the case of group lending of
Grameen Bank without examining the loan absorp-
tive capacity of borrowers, the loan default cost can
be quitehigh (Sinha and Matin 1998; Matin, 1998).
Sharma and Zeller (1997) examined the factors
influencing loan repayment rates in group-based
lending programmes in Bangladesh. Among the
determinants of loan default are loan size, the mean
land owned by the group, the percentage of female
groups, and a variety of other variables describing
the group and its composition and attributes of the
village. These characteristics are highly endogenous
as they are part of the assortative group self-selec-
tion process. In other words, high risk borrowers
would like to join groups with more land so as to
reduce the risk of group default. Wenner (1995)
regressed loan delinquency on the number of mon-
itoring inspections, the average savings of the
group, and the nature of group screening. Neither
Sharma and Zeller nor Wenner used any statistical
treatment for endogeneity A recent study argues
that the high loan recovery rate of Grameen Bank is
not due to group lending or its attributes, but to
staff morale and commitment (Jam 1996). These are
casual observations and difficult to quantify A
study based on branch level data that uses fixed-
effects methods observed that local economic con-
ditions influence the economic viability of projects
and, hence, the loan recovery rate of Grameen
Bank's branches in Bangladesh (Khandker et al.
1995). Group-lending matters for loan recoveries,
but so do the characteristics of borrowers and
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organisers as well as agroclimatic and local eco-
nomic conditions.
4 How to Assess the Impact of a
Micro-Credit Programme
The most effective tool for assessing the benefits of
a micro-credit programme is the measurement of its
impact on the poor in terms of employment,
income, consumption, assets, net worth, nutrition,
contraceptive use, fertility, and children schooling.
The immediate impact of having access to credit
from a micro-credit programme is on employment
and, consequently, income. The induced income
and employment effects may have impact on other
outcomes such as consumption, nutrition, contra-
ceptive use, fertility, and education. In addition,
asset accumulation and hence household net worth
may increase if incomes generated from self-
employment are sufficient to cover the costs of par-
ticipation. But identifying the credit impact is
problematic because of: (a) fungibility of credit; (b)
non-randomness in programme participation; and
(c) non-randomness of programme placement.
Since money is fungible, it is very difficult to iden-
tify the credit impact. However, unlike in formal
credit institutions, the cost of credit in a group-
based credit programme includes not only the inter-
est rate but also the timing of repayment and the
penalties associated with default. Group-based
credit is packaged with responsibilities (meeting
attendance, forced saving, shared default risk) and
benefits (training, insurance, consciousness-rais-
ing). If there were no monitoring of the use of bor-
rowed funds and no group responsibility and
decision-making in the lending programme, indi-
viduals would want to borrow much more than
they actually do in order to capture the premiums
associated with the soft terms of the loan.
Monitoring credit use makes all programme partic-
ipants 'credit constrained', in that the notional
demand for credit always falls short of supply For
these reasons all participating households are pre-
sumed to be in the same credit demand regime,
which means that the amount of credit may directly
enter into the production and consumption deci-
sions (Feder et al. 1988). The close monitoring of
group-based credit partly resolves the problem of
fungibility.
This, of course, does not mean that the amount of
credit borrowed from a group-based micro-credit
programme can enter directly as a regressor in
explaining household and intra-household behav-
iour. lt involves a household decision as to
whether it participates and borrows, It also involves
whether a micro-credit programme is available in
the area where the household resides. Both pro-
gramme placement and programme participation
may not be random. Programme organisers have
the objective of poverty alleviation so they would
like to initiate a programme based on the benefi-
ciary need for credit and the extent of her poverty
On the other hand, even if a programme is available
and the household eligible to participate, the house-
hold would decide not to participate if participation
costs outweighed the benefits, If the household
does decide to participate, the question is whether
a male or female should represent the household.
These are all choice variables likely to be condi-
tioned by individual, household and community
characteristics.
Lack of panel data or natural experiment creates
serious problems in estimating programme impacts.
However, the exogenous eligibility rule5 that pre-
cludes some groups from participating in a pro-
gramme may make identification easier. This
identification strategy was used in Pitt and
Khandker (1996; 1998a) in the case of impact eval-
uation of Grameen Bank, BRAC and RD-12 in
Bangladesh. In a household sample drawn from
both programme and control villages with both
types of household (target, who meet the eligibility
criteria, and non-target) Pitt and Khandker used the
survey data to identify programme effects.
In the same fashion one can estimate programme
impact by the gender of programme participants.
Introducing gender-specific credit involves a num-
ber of estimation problems (Pitt and Khandker
1996; 1998a, 1998b; Pitt, Khandker, McKernan,
and Latif 1995). First, it is likely that the errors of
the women's participation equation are correlated
with the errors of the men participation equation;
that is, common unobservable variables influence
the credit programme behaviour of both women
and men in the household. Second, additional iden-
tification restrictions are required when both men
and women's credit programmes exist, possibly
having different effects on behaviour. The first issue
is computational - bivariate probability distribu-
tions must be evaluated when estimating separate
credit or programme participation equations. The
second issue - that of identification - can be han-
dled by an extension of the exogenous exclusion
restriction. Group-based credit programmes of
BRAC, Grameen Bank, and RD-12 have single-sex
groups. Identification of gender-specific credit is
achieved in the Pitt and Khandker study by the sur-
vey design that includes some households from vil-
lages with only women credit groups and some
households from villages with only men's credit
groups.
5 Conclusion and Scope for
Further Research
Micro-credit programmes are expected to raise the
welfare of the poor, especially women. They would
help raise social welfare by promoting human capi-
tal investment in child-care and education.
However, micro-credit programmes cannot be the
sole instrument for poverty reduction. Micro-credit
requires an entrepreneurial skill that few poor peo-
ple may have. No wonder micro-credit programme
participation is highly self-selective. Data from
Bangladesh shows that only 40 per cent of the poor
households eligible for participation in such tar-
geted programmes actually participate in villages
where programmes have been in place for more
than three years. Further results indicate that few
landless people holding zero land participate; peo-
ple with very low accounting ability measured by
oral mathematical skill also do not participate in
Grameen type operations (Khandker 1998). Hence,
micro-credit is not relevant for the poorest of the
poor and the most illiterate of the illiterate. For
them wage employment is necessary for poverty
reduction, Of course, for those who can afford to
bear the risks of self-employment, the availability of
micro-credit enhances the options of the poor. In
particular, micro-credit programmes are quite help-
ful for opening up economic opportunities for rural
women who cannot afford to be wage employed
outside the home, or do not have the requisite abil-
ity to join the formal labour force. They are the win-
ners in the micro-credit movement.
That is, households with more than half of an acre of land are not eligible to participate in the programme.
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However, often the socïo-economic impacts are
only the short-term impacts. It is an open question
whether these impacts can be sustained over time.
In fact, many of the programme benefits from
micro-credit financing self-employment take time
to be fully realised. For example, the programme
impact on childreris schooling or health status
would take a long time to be fully captured. To cap-
ture the full impact of credit on long-run behav-
iours, including the value of consumption and
assets, one needs to evaluate behavioural impacts
over a relatively longer period. Thus, panel data
analysis is relevant for long-run programme impact
evaluation.
Panel data impact analysis is also necessaiy for
identifying how the participant behaviour changes
over time with respect to the length of programme
participation. It is possible that returns may fall as
rents that accrue to early programme participants
get competed away so that the overall impact will
diminish as more participants join the programme.
Panel data analysis is also desirable to make the
impacts more reliable. When programmes are avail-
able, those households with the most to gain from
access to micro-credit programmes were the first to
join them and their success reflects, to some extent,
positive selection. Later recruits may lack such abil-
ity so that rates of returns may fall over time. Panel
data analysis would help resolve this changing
nature of benefits of micro-credit programmes.
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Programme impacts reported in earlier sections
from Bangladesh measured the influence of three
factors: (i) credit, (ii) length of programme partic-
ipation, and (iii) non-credit. Micro-credit pro-
grammes offer both credit and non-credit inputs.
These non-credit inputs may be important to
change individuals' behaviour and hence, house-
hold and intra-household outcomes. The non-
credit impacts may also change the villagers'
behaviour, even if many of them do not join micro-
credit programmes, because of demonstration
effects. These non-credit impacts may be substantial
and should be identified to justify if they are at all
necessary
Finally, an important future research question is
whether and how the group matters. Does it matter
that the group is the mechanism through which
credit is distributed and monitored, or would credit
provided through other means, such as individual-
based lending schemes, achieve essentially the same
results? Mow are groups formed? How important is
the group in facilitating information flows, con-
sumption smoothing, insurance and consciousness-
raising among the borrowers? How effective is the
group in loan repayment? These are some of the
unresolved issues concerning group-based micro-
credit programmes.
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